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Abstract— Vulnerabilities and the attacks on Ad Hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol are investigated and
studied via analysis and simulation. The attacks are classiﬁed
by their target properties. The analysis shows that the on-
demand route query enables the malicious host to conduct real
time attacks on AODV. False distance vector and false destina-
tion sequence attacks are studied by simulation. Two connec-
tion scenarios: common destination and uniformly distributed
trafﬁcloadareconsidered. Thedeliveryratio, attack overhead,
and the propagation of false routes are measured by varying
the number of connections and the mobility of the hosts. The
simulation results illustrate that the attacker can confuse the
network connectivity with false routes and lead to a decrease
up to 75% in the delivery ratio. When the hosts are uniformly
distributed,thefalsedistancevector attackscannot cheatmore
than half of the hosts. But the false destination sequence routes
can propagate to most of the network. The anomaly patterns
of sequence numbers carried by routing request (RREQ) can
be applied to detect the false destination sequence attacks. The
vulnerability analysis results and anomaly patterns can be em-
ployed byother Ad Hoc routingprotocols to establish intrusion
prevention and detection mechanisms.
Index Terms—Ad Hoc Networks, AODV, Vulnerability, In-
trusion Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
A
mobile Ad Hoc network is a collection of wireless hosts
that can be rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio
network without the aid of any established infrastructure or
centralizedadministration[1]. Suchnetworkscanbeusedto
enable next generation of battleﬁeld applications envisioned
by the military [2], including situation awareness systems
for maneuvering war ﬁghters, and remotely deployed un-
manned micro-sensor networks. Ad Hoc networks can pro-
vide communication for civilian applications, such as dis-
aster recovery and message exchanges among medical and
security personnel involved in rescue missions.
The mobile devices usually have limited storage and low
computational capabilities. They heavily depend on other
hosts and resources for data access and informationprocess-
ing. A reliable network topology must be assured through
efﬁcient and secure routing protocols for Ad Hoc networks.
The research is supported by the Center for Education and Research in
Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), NSF grant CCR-0001788
and CISCO URP.
The paper is accepted to appear in the proceedings of ICT 2003
0-7803-7661-7/03/$17.00 c
￿
2003 IEEE
Many efﬁcient routing protocols for Ad Hoc networks
have been proposed. We may classify them by the timing of
acquisitionofroutinginformationandthemethodsbywhich
the routes are maintained. In the on-demand (reactive) pro-
tocols, such as AODV [3], Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
[4], and Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA)
[5], the routing information is required and established only
when it is needed. In the pro-active protocols, such as Des-
tination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV)[6], Clusterhead
Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) [7], and Wireless Routing
Protocol(WRP) [8],thehostsexchangetheinformationrou-
tinely and construct the routing tables in advance. There are
otherprotocols,suchas Zone-basedRoutingProtocol(ZRP)
[9], that employ both mechanisms. A number of studies on
performance comparison and optimization for these proto-
cols in an attack-freeenvironmenthave beenpublished[10],
[11], [12], [13]. The performance parameters include deliv-
ery ratio, packet delay, protocol overhead, and throughput.
They are measured by varying the input parameters such as
host mobility, host density, and trafﬁc load.
Current Ad Hoc routing protocols assume that the mo-
bile hosts in the Ad Hoc networks will behave properly and
will not introduce malicious information into the systems.
However, considering the environments (battleﬁelds, disas-
ter rescue,etc.) in whichAdHoc networksoperate,the rout-
ing topology is prone to both external and internal attacks
by malicious hosts. Research has been carried out to update
and apply the security methods in wired networks to the Ad
Hoc environments[14], [15]. These include informationen-
cryptionand userauthentication. But these methodsface the
following difﬁculties:
￿ The restriction on power consumption and the limited
computational capability of mobile devices prevent the
use of complex encryption algorithms.
￿ The constantly changing network topology increases
the difﬁculty and overhead of authentication. The dy-
namic membership adds challenges on the key distri-
bution and management.
￿ These methods can only guard against external attacks.
But the internal attacks coming from compromised
hosts have severe impacts on network performanceand
connectivity.
The security and safety characteristics of Ad Hoc routingprotocols are different from those in wired networks. Re-
search is requiredfor the vulnerabilitiesof the protocols,the
possible attacks, and their impacts on the network perfor-
mance.
This research presents a detailed analysis of vulnerabil-
ities and the simulation of attacks on one of the Ad Hoc
routing protocols. We choose AODV as the research ob-
ject. Many methods adopted by AODV, such as on-demand
route query, distance vector, destination sequence, and link
changereports,are also used byotherAd Hoc routingproto-
cols. The research enables us to ascertain the potential con-
nections between the vulnerabilities and these methods.The
results can be appliedbeyondAODV andprovideguidelines
for the design of attack prevention mechanisms and the In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDS).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents the related work. Section III presents an
overviewandcharacterizationof AODV. SectionIV exploits
the vulnerabilities of and attacks on AODV. It classiﬁes the
attacks by their target properties and especially studies the
securitydeﬁcienciescausedbyon-demandroutequery. Sec-
tion V illustrates the damages in practical settings. It col-
lects the impacts of false distance vector attacks and false
destination sequence attacks by simulation. We ﬁnd that a
considerable part of the hosts are cheated by the false routes
and it may drastically lower the delivery ratio. The com-
munication costs of the attacks against the network trafﬁc
load and host mobility are studied. Section VI presents the
anomalypatternsofsequencenumberthat canbe usedin the
detection of false destination sequence attacks. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Research in both theoretical analysis and project devel-
opment is underway to investigate the security of Ad Hoc
networks and to establish IDS. The efforts in securing com-
munication for wireless networks are also relevant to our
work.
Zhang and Lee studied the security characteristics of Ad
Hoc networks. They identifythe difﬁculties in applyingcur-
rent IDS to the wireless environments [16]. They presented
a generic multi-layer integrated IDS infrastructure for the
Ad Hoc networks. But solutions to some critical problems
remain. How to efﬁciently collect the patterns of attacks
and how to safely distribute the intrusion detection results to
individual host need further research. Bhargavan, Zhou and
Haas exploredthe security issues of wireless LANs [17] and
Ad Hoc networks [18]. They summarized the primary prob-
lems to achieve security and the challenges to the routing
protocols.
Several protocolshave beenestablished to protectthe net-
work layer in a mobile Ad Hoc network. The researchers
at UCLA have built a self-organized network-layer security
mechanism to enable the neighborsto monitorthe behaviors
of a speciﬁc host [19]. Hubaux and his colleagues estab-
lished a public key management mechanism in mobile Ad
Hoc networks [20]. It presents a practical solution to the
key management problem stated by Haas in [18]. The eval-
uationof secure routingin Ad Hoc networks can be foundin
[21]. Other security analyses and IDS structures have been
presented in [22], [23], [24], [25]. But no security compar-
isons based on quantitative results have been reached.
Several projects are underway to develop secure commu-
nication or build IDS for Ad Hoc networks [2], [26], [27],
[28]. The technologies include sending data through multi-
path to increase reliability, and monitoring trafﬁc distribu-
tion to avoid DoS attacks. These will increase both compu-
tation and communicationoverheadduring the normal oper-
ation period and affect the network performance.
III. DESCRIPTION OF AODV
AODV is a reactive protocolthat determines routes solely
on-demand. It is based on the distance vector technology.
The hosts only know the next hop to every destination.
When a source host wants to send packets to the destination
andcannotgettheroutesfromits routingtable, it willbroad-
cast a Route Request (RREQ). The receivers may establish
the routes back to the source host throughthe paths that they
get the RREQ. If the receiver has an active route to the des-
tination, it will unicast a Route Reply (RREP) back to the
source. Otherwise,theRREQ willbere-broadcastfurther. If
a reply is sent, all hosts along that path may record the route
to the destination through this packet. Because there may
exist multiple exclusive paths between two hosts, a mobile
hostcan receivethe sameRREQ morethanonce. Toprevent
the same request from being broadcast repeatedly, every re-
quest is uniquely identiﬁed by a
￿ Host ID, Broadcast ID
￿
couple. Every host keeps a record for the RREQs that have
been processed. The mobile hosts send out the Route Error
(RERR) packets to their neighbors to report broken paths
and activate the route re-discovery procedure.
To avoid routing loop and identify the freshness of the
route, destination sequence number is introduced. The se-
quence number of a mobile host can only be updated by it-
self in monotonically increasing mode. A larger sequence
number denotes a fresher route. The sequence number is
carried in both RREQ and RREP. The sequence number in
RREP must be larger than or equal to the one carried in
corresponding RREQ to avoid the source host to adopt a
stale path. When more than one path represented by differ-
ent RREPs is available, the one with the largest destination
sequence number is used. If several paths have the same
sequence number, the shortest one is chosen. More details
about AODV can be found in [3].
AODV’s desirable features are its low byte overhead in
relatively static networks and loop free routing using the
destination sequence numbers. There are improvements
in AODV to support multicast [29] and to detect/maintain
multiple paths [30]. But the on-demand route query usu-
ally brings longer delay for the ﬁrst few packets. It suffers
from the problems of route request ﬂooding and the use ofMAC level broadcast. The genuineness of the destination
sequence and distance vector leaves it vulnerable to attack-
ers. These problems introduce the attacks described next.
IV. ATTACKS ON AODV
The security deﬁciencies of AODV make it vulnerable to
attacks. The RREP is especially attractive to attackers be-
cause the reverse routes established by RREQ will become
expired in a short time if no active trafﬁc uses those routes.
Another hot target of attacks is the broadcastfeature of rout-
ing query. If not handled properly, the ﬂood of queries will
exhaust the valuable bandwidth. We examine the conduct
procedures of the attacks. Their impacts and the propaga-
tion of the false routes are also studied.
A. Classiﬁcation of attacks
The attacks can be classiﬁed in different ways. They can
be based on the sources of the attacks (internal attack, exter-
nal attack), or on the methods through which the attackers
acquire control (e.g. buffer overﬂow, Trojan Horse). Others
use the targets (e.g. ﬁle access control, network connectiv-
ity). We divide them into passive and active attacks. At a
ﬁner level, we categorize the active attacks on AODV by
their target features.
1) Passive attacks: A malicious host conducts a passive
attack on Ad Hoc networks by ignoring operations required
from it. The attacker does not actively initiate malicious ac-
tions to cheat other hosts. One example of passive attacks
on AODV is silent discard that is carried on by an interme-
diate host along the routing path. Instead of forwarding a
packet to the next hop, the attacker drops the data silently.
Another example of passive attacks is partial routing infor-
mation hiding. It is conducted by a malicious host by not
sending out RREP when an active route is available.
It is usually difﬁcult to distinguish passive attacks from
Byzantine failures [31] [32] in Ad Hoc networks. For exam-
ple, a message loss can also occur because of host move-
ment or unreliable wireless media. Fortunately, the con-
stantly changing topology and multiple available paths be-
tween hosts limit the impacts of passive attacks. For exam-
ple, in an Ad Hoc network having 30 hosts and 25 connec-
tions, the silent discard by one malicious host may cause the
delivery ratio to decrease by 3%. The analysis and detection
of passive attacks is not discussed further because such at-
tacks rely more on the network topology than the protocol
characteristics.
2) Activeattacks: Themalicioushostgeneratesanactive
attack by introducing false information into an Ad Hoc net-
work. It confuses routing procedures and degrades network
performance. Three examples of active attacks on AODV
are: false distance vector, false destination sequence, and
vicious query ﬂooding.
AODV is based on the distance vector technologyand the
hosts collectroutinginformationfromimmediateneighbors.
The incomplete knowledge of the global topology enables
the false distance vector attacks. The malicious host forms
this attack by claiming that the destination is one (or a few)
hop(s) from it in the RREP packet even if it does not have
anyavailablepathinits routingtable. Ifnootherrepliespro-
vide a better route, the source will choose the path provided
by the malicious host. The data packets will be dropped or
compromised by the attacker.
AODV employs destination sequence number to identify
the freshness of routing information. When multiple routes
are available, the source host always chooses the one with
the largest sequence number. By assigning a large false des-
tination sequence number in RREP, the attacker’s reply can
easily supersede other replies and attracts the data trafﬁc.
Even worse, the deceived hosts will propagate in good faith
the false route to other hosts and exacerbate the impacts of
the attack.
Viciousqueryﬂoodingtargetsat bandwidthconsumption.
AODV uses broadcastduring the route discoveryprocedure.
The malicious host may choose a non-exist address as the
destination and sends out the RREQ packets at high fre-
quency. The RREQ packets will ﬂood the Ad Hoc network
because no host can give a reply. The ﬂood will delay the
transmission of other trafﬁc and increase the packet drop ra-
tio, thus lowering the performance of the network.
B. Security analysis
1) Security weak points: While the on-demand property
of AODV enables its advantages on low protocol overhead
and adaptabilityto host movement,it is lenient to the attack-
ers. It has the following disadvantages on security:
The on-demand property of AODV enables the malicious
hosts to conduct real time attacks. Most of the attacks on
AODV do not need any preparation or establishment time.
For example, when a source host broadcasts RREQ in the
network, the malicious host may immediately form a false
route reply and execute the attack. As a comparison, when
the malicious host tries to attack a pro-active protocol, it
must send out the false information in advance and has to
routinely update the fake route to keep it alive. The longer
a false route exists, larger the probability that it is detected.
It is difﬁcult to catch an on-going attack on AODV before it
causes performance degradation.
The on-demand property of AODV enables the attackers
to have multiple choices of the targets and points in time
of attacks. For example, the malicious host can choose to
attack the RREQ coming from a speciﬁc source, or it may
choose to attack all connections to a particular destination.
It can attack the same host with different methods. As to
one victim, the attacker can send false replies to some of the
routingqueries while leaving others untouched. By compar-
ison, thefalse routeina pro-activeprotocolusuallyhasﬁxed
object and ﬁxed type of attack. This increases the probabil-
ity that the attacker is detected and located.
It is more difﬁcult to trace back the sources of the false
information in AODV than in a pro-active protocol. As dis-
cussed earlier, the attacks on AODV focus on the RREPpackets. The routing reply is unicasted back to the source.
Unless the mobile hosts monitor all nearby trafﬁc, there will
be only one host along the false route that directly receives
the false information from the attacker. For the intruder
identiﬁcation algorithms that use quorum voting to locate
the suspicious attacker [33], AODV is less efﬁcient on the
trace back procedures.
2) Propagation of false routes: In AODV, the false
RREP will be unicasted back to the source host. In [34]
it has been shown that the average path length is propor-
tional to the square root of host density in Ad Hoc networks.
Therefore the number of hosts immediately cheated by a
false RREP is proportionalto that order. Since an intermedi-
ate host maysend outRREP to otherroutequeryafterwards,
the false routes will form a tree rooted at the malicious host.
In a pro-active protocol, the false routes will be transmitted
to a growing surrounding area by the routine exchanges of
routing information until they are replaced by better routes.
A single false route in AODV propagates slower and has
weaker impacts.
3) Cancellation of false routes: As the intrusion detec-
tion systems in Ad Hoc networks develop, the malicious
hostsometimeshastocancelthefalseroutesoriginatedfrom
it to avoid being identiﬁed. In most of the Ad Hoc routing
protocols, the updates to current routes are caused either by
the break of an active link or the appearance of a fresher or
shorter path. The attacker in a pro-active protocol can stop
sending false routes to cancel the impacts. The new updates
will be propagated to the neighbors and the false routes will
be smoothly replaced by the real ones. The number of hosts
that notice this change depends on the propagation range of
the false routes. In AODV when the attacker stops sending
packets, the neighbors will assume that the link is broken.
The re-discovery procedure will broadcast RREQ through-
outthenetwork. Itis moredifﬁcultfortheattackerinAODV
to silently cancel the false routes.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We study the practical impacts of the attacks on the per-
formance of Ad Hoc networks through simulation. Two at-
tacks on AODV are considered: false distance vector and
false destination sequence. Except for sending false routes,
the attacker will discard any data packets passing through it.
We have designed two test conditions to examine their im-
pacts. Under condition one, all connections have the same
destination. We measure the delivery ratio, attack overhead,
and the propagation of false routes when the malicious host
attacks the common destination. Under condition two, a
more sophisticated trafﬁc scenario is used. We study the
delivery ratio and attack overhead against the mobility of
the hosts. We ﬁrst describe the simulation environment and
present the two cases separately.
A. Simulation Environment
The simulationofattacks onAODV is deployedusingns2
with CMU extension blocks for Ad Hoc networks [35]. Ta-
ble I lists the simulation parameters.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Simulator ns-2
Simulation duration 1000 seconds
Simulation area 1000 * 1000 m
Number of mobile hosts 30
Transmission range 250 m
Movement model Random waypoint
Maximum speed 5 – 20 m / s
Trafﬁ c type CBR (UDP)
Data payload 512 bytes
Packet rate 2 pkt / s
Number of malicious host 1
Host pause time 10 seconds
The choice of the parameters considersboth accuracyand
efﬁciency of the simulation. The host moving speed cov-
ers a range from human jogging to vehicle riding in country
ﬁeld. Faster speed is not considered because the frequency
of route changes will be too high and affect the performance
degradation caused by attacks. The packet rate of connec-
tions is chosen to avoid packet drop caused by congestion
even when there are multiple connections converging at the
same host.
We choose the following metrics to evaluate the impacts
of attacks: (1) packet delivery ratio (2) false routing packets
sent by the attacker (3) the number of normal hosts that are
cheated by the false routes.
The ﬁrst metric is selected to evaluate the percentage of
packets that are affected by the attacks. This can be viewed
as the ”strength” of an attack. The second metric is used to
examine the overheadof different attacks. Here we consider
only the extra cost on communication. If more comprehen-
sive analysis is required, the overhead on computation and
storage should be explored. The third metric examines the
propagationof false routes and the potential impacts that are
notincludedintheﬁrst metric. Togetherwithmetrictwo,we
can collect a more comprehensiveview of the impacts of the
attacks.
B. Results of condition one
Under condition one, all connections have different
sources and use node 29 as the destination. Node 5 is the
malicious host and it attacks every RREQ that it receives.
We observe selected parameters against the number of con-
nections. Because there are 30 hosts in the network, the
maximum number of connections from different sources to
node 29 is twenty-eight (except node 5 and 29). The max-
imum speed of host movement is 5m/s. Every point in the
ﬁgures is an average value of data collected from ten differ-
ent host movement scenarios. To calculate the number of
hosts getting cheated by the false routes, the routing trees to
node 29 are examined every 50 seconds. Figure 1, 2, 3, and
4 show the simulation results.
Figure 1 shows the delivery ratio versus the number of
connections to node 29 under three scenarios: when node5 does not conduct attacks, when it attacks the routes with
false distance vector, and when it attacks the routes with
false destination sequence. From ﬁgure 1 we note that the
impact of the false destination sequence attack is more se-
vere than that of false distance vector attack. The reason is
that AODV prefers fresh routes to short ones.
One interesting observation is that when the network is
under attack, the delivery ratio will increase slowly as the
number of connections increases. This is due to the fact that
the attacker does not apply any intelligent destination se-
quence prediction methods. On the contrary, the malicious
host adds a constant to the sequence in RREQ and uses the
result as the sequence in RREP. As the number of connec-
tions increases the true sequence increases faster. The prob-
ability that the chosen fake sequence is smaller than the true
one also increases. Thus less trafﬁc will be attracted to the
attacker. From ﬁgure 1, we observe that one aggressive at-
tacker may cause about 45% or 75% of the packets to be
dropped. The impacts of active attacks on Ad Hoc networks
are much more severe than those of passive attacks.
Figure 2 shows the number of hosts that are cheated by
the false routes versus the number of connections. As the
number of connections increases more false RREP will be
sent by the attacker. Therefore more normal hosts will be
cheated. From ﬁgure 2 we ﬁnd that false destination se-
quence attacks can cheat up to 70% of the hosts in the sys-
tem while the false distance vector attacks only cheat less
than a half of the hosts. It is determined by the properties of
the two attacks. A host will choose the false distance vec-
tor route only when it is closer to the attacker than to the
real destination. If the hosts are uniformly distributed in the
test area, it is not difﬁcult to conclude that about half of the
hosts will be closer to the attacker. They will be cheated
if the sequence number in false routes is the same as in the
real ones. Because AODV gives the destination sequence
a higher priority, the false destination sequence attacks can
cheat all hosts except the real destination. This explains the
difference between the impacts of two attacks shown in ﬁg-
ure 2. It also explains the difference between the delivery
ratio curves shown in ﬁgure 1. When the network is under
false distance vectorattacks, about50% of the packets reach
their destination. But when the network is under false desti-
nation sequence attacks, the delivery ratio is much lower.
Figure 3 shows the communication overhead of the two
attacks. Because in AODV every RREP can only attack
one RREQ, the number of false RREP sent by the attacker
is roughly proportional to the number of connections. The
curves for the two kinds of attacks are very close to each
other. It shows that both attacks put similar trafﬁc overhead
on the attacker. But the curve for false destination sequence
attacks is a little higher. It is because the false destination
sequence numbers sent by the malicious host disturb the up-
dates of real number and introduce more route queries into
the system.
Figure 4 examines the number of hosts got cheated ver-
sus the number of false RREP sent by the attacker. It can
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Fig. 2. The number of hosts got cheated versus the number of connections
to node 29.
be viewed as the “efﬁciency” of the attacks. Combining
data from ﬁgure 2 and ﬁgure 3, it is not difﬁcult to explain
the reason that ﬁgure 4 has similar observations as ﬁgure 2.
Sending the same number of false RREP, attacks on desti-
nation sequence can cheat more hosts because AODV is in
favor of fresh routes.
Combining the four ﬁgures, we note that the attacks on
destination sequence and the attacks on distance vector have
about the same overheadbut the former has more severe im-
pacts. For the intrusion prevention and intrusion detection
systems designed to protect Ad Hoc networks using AODV,
this kind of attack should be considered ﬁrst.
C. Results of condition two
Under condition two, we generate a connection scenario
in which each of the twenty-nine normal hosts is the source
of oneconnectionand the destinationof anotherconnection.
Node 5 is the attacker. We study the selected parameters
versus the mobility of the hosts, which is represented by the
maximum moving speed. The results are shown in ﬁgure 5
and 6.
Figure 5 shows the delivery ratio versus the maximum
speed of hosts under the scenarios the same as in ﬁgure 1.
The delivery ratio under normal condition does not vary a
lot. It shows that the mobility of host is still within the suit-50
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Fig. 3. The false RREP sent by attacker versus the number of connections
to node 29.
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attacker.
able serving range of AODV. When the network is under at-
tack, the delivery ratio only ﬂuctuates within a small range.
This is because the route changes caused by host movement
put challenges on both the normal hosts and the attacker.
The broken routes lead to the drop of packets. On the other
hand, because of the break of false routes, the source hosts
will activate the route discovery procedures and they have
chance to construct the paths that do not pass through the
malicious host. When the source hosts send out requests,
other hosts can update their routing tables through the paths
that they receive the RREQ. They take effects at the same
time and keep the delivery ratio roughly stable. Compared
to ﬁgure 1, we ﬁnd that more data packets arrive at the des-
tinations under attacks. This can be explained by the differ-
ence between the connection scenarios of the two test cases.
Under condition two every host is the source of one connec-
tion. It will broadcast the RREQ throughout the network.
Other hosts can establish the routes through the paths from
which they receivethe request. Thereforemanyhosts do not
have to listen to the false RREP sent by the attacker. More
true routes are set up and the delivery ratio is higher.
Figure 6 shows the numberof RREP sent by node 5 when
it behaves properly and when it conducts the attacks. Com-
pared to the normal condition, the attacker will send ﬁve to
ten times more RREP when it attacks every request that it
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Fig. 6. The attack overhead versus the mobility of hosts.
receives. If the mobile hosts monitor the nearby trafﬁc, this
anomalous increase can be used as the pattern to activate
IDS to examine possible attacks.
VI. DETECTING FALSE DESTINATION SEQUENCE
ATTACKS ON AODV
Whenthemalicioushostsintroducefalseinformationinto
the networks, their behaviors and the conﬂicts between false
and true information form special patterns, which can be
used to detect the attacks. In addition, the connectivity his-
tory and the propagation paths of the false information can
be used to identify the sources of attacks. Our research on
securityin AdHoc networks[36]tries to collectinformation
and patterns of attacks and to provide the guidelines for the
design of the intrusion detection systems. An example of
detecting attacks on destination sequence in AODV is dis-
cussed next.
From the simulation results, we ﬁnd that the attack on
destination sequence has the worst impacts on data delivery
ratio. To “beat” other available routes, the attacker must
choose a large number as the false sequence to show its
“freshness”. The false number will be larger than the se-
quence generated by the real destination. Later when a host
on the false route moves out of the range of its neighbor, the
re-initiation procedure of the source will send out RREQ−1
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Fig. 7. The difference between two sequences when the network is normal
and when the host is under destination sequence attack.
that carries the false sequence. Because the RREQ is broad-
cast throughout the network, there is a good chance that the
real destination will receive the request. If the false number
is still larger than the real sequence, the destination host will
ﬁnd that it is under attack. The detection of false destination
sequence attacks in AODV heavily depends on the mobil-
ity of hosts. Therefore, no upper limit of delay between the
attack is conducted and it is detected can be guaranteed.
Under normal operation of AODV, the destination se-
quence number carried in RREQ can never be larger than
the real sequence plus one. But when a host is under attack
ondestinationsequence,thedifferencebetweenthe received
and local sequence numbers will be equal or larger than 2.
Figure 7 gives an exampleof the differencebetween the two
sequence numbers detected by a normal host. When it is
under attack, the normal host detects eleven times that the
incoming sequence number is larger than local number plus
one in one thousand seconds of simulation time.
From the analysis we know that some false sequence
numbers are not detected. Two problems that impact the de-
tection of false destination sequence attacks in AODV are:
(1) The real sequence may outrun the false one when it is
received by the victim. Then the host cannot ﬁnd the false
number. (2) A tighter limit of the delay between the false
sequence is generated and it reaches the victim, if the two
hosts are connected, should be achieved. We are working
on the solutions to these problems. A protocol that uses
one detected attack to activate the detection of other at-
tacks has been designed in AODV [33]. The basic idea is
to re-examineall routing informationcoming from the same
sources and activate the re-discovery.
Collecting and determining the anomaly patterns of at-
tacks is a challenging topic in intrusion detection in Ad Hoc
networks and is still under research. The example provided
above shows that by combining the protocol analysis and
practical simulation we may accelerate this procedure. We
plan to apply this mechanism to the establishment of our
IDS and the design of a secure routing protocol.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The security of the Ad Hoc network routing protocols
is still an open problem and deserves more research work.
This paper studies the vulnerabilities and attacks on one of
the protocols – AODV. The analysis shows that although
AODV provides fair performance with reasonable overhead
andprovidesadaptabilityto bothtrafﬁcload andhost mobil-
ity, the on-demand property allows the malicious host to at-
tack the network in real time with ﬂexibility. It is difﬁcult to
locate the sources of the false information. The attacks may
lead to the confusion on network connectivity or exhaustion
of the limited bandwidth,thus degradingthe performanceof
the networks. The simulation has shown that the attacks can
drastically lower the delivery ratio and cheat a considerable
part of the hosts with false routes.
The research on protecting wired network routing proto-
cols [37] has shown that it is the property, instead of the
protocol detail, that leads to the vulnerability. The example
attacks on AODV (false distance vector,false destinationse-
quence) can also be applied to attack other protocols shar-
ing the properties (e.g. DSDV). Thus the theoretical analy-
sis of the vulnerability and anomaly patterns of the attacks
can be employed to prevent or detect the conterminous at-
tacks on different protocols. The paper presents the detec-
tion of false destination sequence attacks by monitoring the
sequence numbers carried in RREQ. This detection method
can be applied to protect DSDV with minor changes.
There are many problems to be solved in protecting the
Ad Hoc networks. We plan to study other features of
the routing protocols to exploit their security vulnerabili-
ties. The robustness comparison among the routing proto-
cols (such as AODV, DSDV, andZRP) againstconterminous
attacks (e.g. false distance vector) will be conducted. On
achieving the secure distribution of individual intrusion de-
tection results, we plan to establish the trust relation among
hosts in the open area of Ad Hoc networks [38]. The results
will providethe guidelinesforthedesignofa secureAd Hoc
routing protocol and form the building blocks of an IDS for
Ad Hoc networks.
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